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JUVENILE LAW - EXTENSION DENIED:

MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
RULES JUVENILE SENTENCES WITH THE

-

ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMONWEALTH V. BRIGHT, 974 N.E.2D 1092

(MASS. 2012), AFF'D, NO. 14-P-546, 2016 MASS.
APP. UNPUB. LEXIS 379 (MASS. APP. CT. 2016).
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article XXVI of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution
In cases
protects individuals against cruel and unusual punishment.'
involving juveniles, courts have held that life sentences without the
2
possibility of parole are unconstitutional. In Commonwealth v. Bright,' the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") considered whether to
extend this constitutional prohibition to include juvenile life sentences that
are accompanied by the possibility of parole.4 The Court held that juvenile
life sentences which do provide for the possibility of parole do not violate
the Eighth Amendment nor Article XXVI of the Declaration of Rights of the

I See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (explaining protection from cruel and unusual protections)
("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."); see also MASS. CONST. pt.1, art. XXVI (prohibiting excessive bail or
fines, and cruel punishments). Article XXVI states in full:
No magistrate or court of law, shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive
fines, or inflict cruel or unusual punishments. No provision of the Constitution, however,
shall be construed as prohibiting the imposition of the punishment of death. The general
court may, for the purpose of protecting the general welfare of the citizens, authorize the
imposition of the punishment of death by the courts of law having jurisdiction of crimes
subject to the punishment of death.
Id.
2
See, e.g., Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney, 1 N.E.3d 270, 286 (Mass. 2013) (determining
mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole for juveniles who commit murder is invalid);
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 490 (2012) (stating mandatory life sentence
without parole for juvenile offenders violates Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 82 (2010) (holding juvenile life sentence without possibility of parole for non-homicide
offenses violated Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (adopting
categorical rule under Eighth Amendment prohibiting death penalty for juvenile offenders).
3 See Commonwealth v. Bright, 974 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. 2012), aff'd, No. 14-P-546, 2016
Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016).
4 See id. at 2 (considering prohibition on all juvenile life sentences regardless of eligibility of
parole).
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Massachusetts Constitution, and affirmed the life sentence imposed on the
juvenile defendant, Ahmad Bright ("Bright").'
On the night of March 18, 2006, Remel Ahart ("Ahart"), acting on
behalf of Bright's older brother, Sherrod Bright ("Sherrod"), shot the victim,
Corey Davis ("Davis"), for a fee.6 Bright was armed and accompanied Ahart
to the scene of the crime.7 At the time, Bright was only sixteen years old.'
A jury in the Massachusetts Supreme Superior Court convicted Bright of
second-degree murder, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, and
unlawful possession of a firearm.9 The trial judge sentenced Bright "to a
term of life on the murder conviction and to concurrent sentences of four and
three years respectively on the remaining convictions."o Bright appealed
both his convictions as well as the denial of his motion for a new trial."
5

See id. at 4-5 (denying categorically prohibition of life sentences for juveniles).
6 See Commonwealth v. Bright, 974 N.E.2d 1092, 1097 (Mass. 2012) (describing the case "as
an 'alleged contract killing by one drug dealer of another."'). James Miller, a key witness,
described the circumstances surrounding the crime recounting that Bright and Ahart believed
Davis, the victim, stole $15,000 from Sherrod, and Sherrod wanted Davis killed. Id. at 1098.
Sherrod allegedly offered Ahart and Bright money to kill Davis. Id. Ahart, Miller, and Bright saw
Davis's car and, having already obtained a 9 millimeter semi-automatic pistol, fired multiple shots
into the vehicle from the passenger side, striking Davis multiple times. See Brief for the
Commonwealth at 7, Bright, 974 N.E.2d at 10972 (Mass. 2012), affd, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016),2015 WL 5223642 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 26,2015)
(explaining circumstances of shooting). Davis's cousin, Troy Davis, who was driving the vehicle,
tried to escape at which point he opened his door and saw Bright in a "firing stance" pointing his
gun directly at him. Id. Ahart then fired more shots when he and Bright fled the scene. Id. Davis
was transported to Massachusetts General Hospital and shortly thereafter died from the gunshot
wounds. Id.
7 See Bright, 974 N.E.2d at 1097 (stating defendant claimed errors by trial judge). Bright
emphasized to the court that although he was with Ahart, it was never alleged that he shot the
victim. Brief for the Commonwealth at 3-4, Commonwealth v. Bright, 974 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass.
2012), affd, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016), 2015 WL
5223642 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 2015) (stating Bright's argument).
8 See Bright, 974 N.E.2d at 1097 (explaining Bright's young age); see also Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 2, Commonwealth v. Bright, 974 N.E.2d 1092 (Mass. 2012), affd, No. 14-P-546,
2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016), 2016 WL 6407545 (U.S. Oct. 28,
2016) (No. 16-579), (discussing how holding violates Eighth Amendment) ("This case is a perfect
example of why such a sentencing regime is inconsistent with the Court's reasoning in Miller and
violates the Eighth Amendment."). "This case concerns the constitutionality of a mandatory
sentencing regime under which a child who participated in a shooting that was committed by a codefendant was automatically sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison unless a future parole
board grants discretionary early release." Id.
9 See Commonwealth v. Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379, at *1
(Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016) (listing Bright's charges).
10 See id. (providing background on Bright's sentencing).
11 See Bright, 974 N.E.2d at 1099 (discussing defendant's argument that jury considered
extraneous and prejudicial information during deliberation). "The jury heard conflicting testimony
about Bright's participation in Davis's death." Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Bright, No. 14P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (No. 16-579), 2016 WL 6407545 (U.S. Oct. 28,2016)
(highlighting Bright's involvement in feud between adult drug dealers). James Miller, the initial
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On direct appellate review, the SJC affirmed Bright's murder
conviction and his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, but
vacated the assault with a dangerous weapon conviction.1 2 The case was
"remanded for entry of a judgment of simple assault".13 Bright proceeded
by filing a motion for resentencing pursuant to Rule 30(a) of the
Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the judge denied the
motion.1 4 On appeal, the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the trial
judge's order, denying the motion for resentencing.1 5
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been
interpreted to prohibit life sentences without the possibility of parole for
juvenile homicide offenders.' 6 The fundamental principle of article XXVI
of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution dictates that

murder suspect, "was arrested after fleeing to Virginia but, after cooperating with police and
testifying against Bright and Ahart, was not charged for the murder." Id. at 5-6. Miller was also
the only witness who placed Bright at the crime scene. Id. Troy Davis testified that a second
unidentified individual was at the scene and pointed a gun at him but did not fire it. Id. at 5.
12 See Bright, 974 N.E.2d at 1097-98 (outlining appellate history).
13 See id. at 1098 (describing defendant's charges). The revolver from the crime scene was
never discharged, though it appeared an attempt to discharge was made. Id. at 1098 n.4. The SJC
reduced Bright's conviction of assault by means of a dangerous weapon to simple assault as a matter
of law because the original charge was "not a lesser-included offense of the charge of armed assault
with intent to murder." See Brief for the Commonwealth at 4-5, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 379, 2015 WL 5223642 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 2015) (detailing prior
proceedings).
14 See Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr.
4, 2016) (summarizing history of procedure). Bright filed the motion in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama,butJustice Billings denied it without a hearing. Brief for the
Commonwealth at 5, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379, 2015 WL
5223642 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 2015) (explaining denial of motion). Bright argues that when
he was sentenced his age, maturity, and other factors were not considered. Id. at 22. See also MASS.
R. CRIM. P. 30(a) (noting post-conviction relief) Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule
30 (a) states in full:
(a) Unlawful Restraint. Any person who is imprisoned or whose liberty is restrained
pursuant to a criminal conviction may at any time, as of right, file a written motion
requesting the trial judge to release him or her or to correct the sentence then being served
upon the ground that the confinement or restraint was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Id.
15 See Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379, at *5 (stating Appeals
Court's affirmation of lower court's decision to deny motion).
16 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 461 (2012) (involving multiple cases with fourteenyear-olds sentenced to life without parole). One of the cases discussed in Miller, was about a
fourteen-year-old, Jackson, who was outside of a video store when his co-conspirators shot and
killed the store clerk. Id. Another case discussed, Miller, a juvenile, who along with a friend, killed
his neighbor by beating him and setting fire to his trailer. Id.
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"criminal punishment be proportionate to the offender and the offense."l 7
The United States Supreme Court and Massachusetts Courts have heard and
decided several cases centered on juvenile sentencing."
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment bars the death penalty for offenders who were under the age of
eighteen when their crimes were committed.19 "The result of the Roper
decision was to leave intact a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile
homicide offender, thereby implicitly endorsing the constitutionality of such
a sentence." 20 Later, in Graham v. Florida,the Supreme Court held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits a life sentence without the possibility of parole
for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide .21 "Thus, its reasoning
implicates any life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile, even as its
categorical bar relates only to nonhomicide offenses." 22 For sentencing

11 See Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney, 1 N.E.3d 270, 284 (Mass. 2013) (rendering when
justifications for sentencing adults are applied to juveniles it is suspect).
18 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (stating that mandatory sentence of
life without parole for juvenile offenders violates Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding sentences of life without parole for non-homicide offenses
by juveniles violate Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (adopting
categorical nmle under Eighth Amendment prohibiting death penalty for juvenile offenders);
Commonwealth v. Okoro, 26 N.E.3d 1092, 1101 (Mass. 2015) (holding mandatory life sentence
with parole eligibility after fifteen years for juvenile homicide offender constitutional); Diatchenko
v. Dist. Attorney, 1 N.E.3d 270, 276 (Mass. 2013) (concluding mandatory life without parole
unconstitutional as applied to juveniles who committed murder).
19 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79 (describing "innovative principles" embodied in Constitution
including preservation of human dignity); "As the Court explained in Atkins, the Eighth
Amendment guarantees individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. The right
flows from the basic 'precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to [the] offense."' Id. at 560 (alteration in original) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. 304,
311 (2002). "Focusing on how 'contemporary standards of decency' had changed since Stanford
v. Kentucky, the decision relied heavily on the prohibition of death sentences for the mentally
retarded in Atkins v. Virginia." Sara E. Fiorillo, Note, Mitigating After Miller: Legislative
Considerations and Remedies for the Future of Juvenile Sentencing, 93 B.U.L. REv. 2095, 2103
(2013). "Roper marked a huge victory for juvenile justice advocates not only because of its ban of
the juvenile death penalty, but also because of the abundance of language acknowledging that
children must be treated differently from adults." Id.
20 See Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 279 (Mass. 2013) ("[T]he Court affirmed the judgment of the
Missouri Supreme Court, which had vacated the defendant's death sentence and imposed a lifewithout-parole sentence.").
21 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 74 (rejecting State's justification that life imprisonment without
parole is rehabilitative for juvenile offenders). "Juveniles are more capable of change than are
adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of 'irretrievably depraved character' than are
the actions of adults." Id. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S., at 570). The Court made comparisons to
a death sentence, "pointing out that the sentence's severity is magnified for the juvenile offender,
who will serve a longer term and for 'a greater percentage of his life' than an adult." Sara E. Fiorillo,
supra note 19, at 2104 (analyzing GrahamCourt's opinion).
22 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 461 (involving cases of fourteen-year-olds sentenced to life without
parole). "Although we do not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide
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purposes, Roper and Graham establish that minors are constitutionally
distinct from adults. 23 In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that
when a State seeks to impose life in prison without parole on a juvenile
homicide offender, there must be an individualized hearing to assess whether
the punishment is appropriate under the circumstances .24
The Massachusetts SJC found that any life-without-parole sentence
for juveniles, whether mandatory or discretionary, violates article XXVI. 2 5
After considering expert evidence on the brain development, the court
determined juvenile offenders should be afforded the opportunity to at least
be considered for parole.26 In contrast, Commonwealth v. Brown permits
imposition of mandatory life sentences on juveniles so long as they are made

cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480.
23 See id. at 471 (stating decisions rested not only on what "any parent knows" but on science).
"Because juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform, we explained,
'they are less deserving of the most severe punishments."' Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
"As 'any parent knows,' and 'developments in psychology and brain science continue to show,'
there are 'fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds."' Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 10, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr.
4, 2016) (No. 16-579) 2016 WL 6407545 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 470).
24 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 (requiring consideration of how children are different from
adults). "Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process-considering an
offender's youth and attendant characteristics-before imposing a particular penalty." Id. at 483.
"In the years preceding Miller, the Supreme Court shifted from a view that seemed to mirror the
tough-on-crime approach taken by the federal government as well as state legislatures." Sara E.
Fiorillo, supra note 19, at 2102 (summarizing timeline of Supreme Court outlook on punishments).
25 See Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 284-85 (discussing remedy to address statutory provisions).
'" [T]he power to grant parole, being fundamentally related to the execution of a prisoner's sentence,
lies exclusively within the province of the executive branch."' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
17, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4,2016) (No.
16-579), 2016 WL 6407545 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016) (quoting Diatchenko, 27 N.E. 3d 349, 369 (Mass.
2015)).
26 See Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 277 (differentiating juveniles from adult offenders). "Simply
put, because the brain of juvenile is not fully developed, either structurally or functionally, by the
age of eighteen, a judge cannot find with confidence that a particular offender, at that point in time,
is irretrievably depraved." Id. at 284. See also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)
("The likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches
any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent."). "The
Massachusetts Parole Board is, like most boards, part of the executive branch-the branch
responsible for prosecuting defendants and pursuing lengthy prison sentences." Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at 17, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct.
Apr. 4, 2016). (No. 16-579), 2016 WL 6407545 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016). Prisoners sentenced to life
sentences as juveniles in many states must typically wait years, even decades, before becoming
eligible for a first parole board review, let alone actual release. ACLU, False Hope - How Parole
Systems Fail Youth Serving Extreme Sentences 32-33 (Nov. 29, 2016), available at
https://www.aclu.org/report/report-false-hope-how-parole-systems-fail-youth-serving-extremesentences.
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eligible for parole.2 7 "Diatchenko and Brown, which both involved juvenile
homicide offenders convicted of murder in the first degree, left in place the
mandatory life sentence imposed by the murder sentencing statute, G.L. c.
265, §228, but declared invalid, as applied to the two defendants and similarly
situated juvenile homicide offenders, the portion of that statute that rendered
persons convicted of murder in the first degree ineligible for parole."29
Finally in Commonwealth v. Okoro, the court held that a mandatory life
sentence, with parole eligibility after fifteen years for a juvenile homicide
offender convicted of murder in the second degree, did not violate the Eighth
Amendment or article XXVI of the Declaration of Rights of the
Massachusetts Constitution.'

27 See Brown, 1 N.E.3d at 268 (concluding judge's application of Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 265, §2
(LexisNexis 2017) was correct). The modem parole system "suffers from four defects that prevent
it from resolving the constitutional violation created by the imposition of mandatory life sentences
on juveniles: (1) the infrequency and limited value of parole board reviews; (2) the manner in which
parole boards exercise their sweeping discretion; (3) the absence of transparency surrounding
parole board decisions; and (4) the politicization and lack of expertise that pervade modem parole
boards." Brief for Amici Curiae Citizens for Juvenile Justice, Committee for Public Counsel
Services, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Economic Justice, Massachusetts Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National
Juvenile Defender Center, and National Juvenile Justice Network in Support of Petitioner at 8-9,
Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016). (No.
16-579), 2016 WL 7041861 (U.S. Nov. 28, 2016).
28 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, §2 (defining penalty for murder). The statute states in full:

a) Except as provided in subsection (b), any person who is found guilty of murder in the
first degree shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life and shall not
be eligible for parole pursuant to section 133A of chapter 127.
(b) Any person who is found guilty of murder in the first degree who committed the
offense on or after the person's fourteenth birthday and before the person's eighteenth
birthday shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life and shall be
eligible for parole after the term of years fixed by the court pursuant to section 24 of
chapter 279.
(c) Any person who is found guilty of murder in the second degree shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for life and shall be eligible for parole after the term of
years fixed by the court pursuant to section 24 of chapter 279.
(d) Any person whose sentence for murder is commuted by the governor and council
pursuant to section 152 of chapter 127 shall thereafter be subject to the laws governing
parole.
Id.
29 See Commonwealth v. Okoro, 26 N.E.3d 1092, 1098 (Mass. 2015) (permitting parole board
to consider individualized characteristics of juveniles convicted of first degree murder).
30 See id. at 1101. In Bright, the Commonwealth argued the court was bound by Okoro's
decision which held that "'we do not read Miller as a whole to indicate that the proportionality
principle at the core of the Eighth Amendment would bar a mandatory sentence of life with parole
eligibility after fifteen years for a juvenile convicted of murder in the second degree.' Brief for the
Commonwealth at 20, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct.
Apr. 4,2016). (No. 14-P-546), 2015 WL 5223642 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 2015).
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In Commonwealth v. Bright, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
reasoned that the argument for extending the prohibition against sentencing
juveniles to life with the possibility of parole, required reading the evidence
in a view that favored the defendant." The Appeals Court relied on prior
cases that "state unambiguously that the unconstitutional aspect of a
sentence that does not allow the possibility of parole is its irrevocability."32
Unlike this case where the defendant was attempting to reduce the severity
of specific crime, Miller and Okoro were based on the undesirability of
deeming juveniles incorrigible due to their young age.3 3 The Appeals Court
concluded that Bright's arguments of trying to expand preceding
interpretations of the State and Federal Constitutions were "properly
34
addressed" to those decisions the court is bound to follow.

In Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court identified three
significant characteristics that differentiate juveniles from adult offenders for
purposes of Eighth Amendment analysis. 3 5 First, children demonstrate "'a
lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility"', leading
juveniles to act with greater recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risktaking.36 Second, children are more vulnerable to negative influences and

31 See Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379, 4 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4,
2016). The Commonwealth argued that although Bright did not fire the shots that killed Davis,
"the evidence at trial supported his conviction for the more serious crime of joint venture in the
first degree based on deliberate premeditation." Brief for the Commonwealth at 47, Bright, No. 14P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379, 2015 WL 5223642 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 26,2015).
32 See Bright, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 at 4. The Commonwealth recognized that
the irrevocability of life sentences without the possibility of parole meant sentences that
"impermissibly provide no opportunity to assess or to take into account a child's capacity to be
reformed in deciding when (or if) he should be released from prison." Respondent's Brief in
Opposition at 7, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr.
4, 2016) (No. 16-579), (Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 20, 2017).
33 See Bright, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 at 4 (articulating rational underlying both
cases' decisions). Bright contended that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juveniles who are
convicted as joint venturers from being given the same sentence as juveniles who are convicted as
principals. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 7-8, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016) (No. 16-579), 2017 WL 604578 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb.
20, 2017). Massachusetts's law defines joint venturer as "one who aids, conrnands, counsels, or
encourages commission of a crime while sharing with the principal the mental state required for
the crime." Id. at 3-4 (citing Commonwealth v. Semedo, 921 N.E.2d 57, 65 (2010))
3 See Bright, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 at 5 (citing Commonwealth v. Dube, 796
N.E. 2d 859 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003)). "The Commonwealth argues this Court should delay review
to afford more opportunities for States to experiment with 'differing approaches to juvenile
sentencing."' Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4,2016) (No. 16-579), 2017 WL 782833 (U.S. Feb. 28,2017).
35 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471
(highlighting that cases concerning juvenile sentencing were
based not only on what 'any parent knows' but on science).
36 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (recognizing juveniles propensity for risk taking distinguishes
minors from adults for sentencing purposes) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993));
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outside pressures, including pressure from their family and peers; they have
limited control over their own environment; and they lack the ability to
extricate themselves from crime-producing settings.37 Finally, a child's
character is not as "well formed" as that of an adult; a child's traits are "less
fixed" therefore his or her actions are less likely to be evidence of
irretrievable depravity."
"After being convicted of second-degree murder as a joint venturer,
Bright was never afforded any consideration of his age, the nature of his
involvement in the crime," or any other factors before he received an
automatic life sentence with possibility of parole. 39 Bright was sixteen years
old at the time of the crime and had no previous criminal record." Bright
"excelled academically and athletically", and had a promising future ahead
of him. 4 1 However, the trial judge was barred from considering these

see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (determining Eddings turbulent family
history, abuse, and severe emotional disturbance was relevant mitigating evidence).
3 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (acknowledging inability of juveniles to remove themselves from
criminal environments) (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115). "This is explained in part by the
prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over their
own environment." Id. (citing Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am.
Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003)).
38 See id. at 570 (recognizing increased difficulty of determining whether juveniles are
incorrigible criminals). "The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is
less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of
irretrievably depraved character." Id.
39 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016) (No. 16-579), 2016 WL 6407545 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016)
('This case is a perfect example of why such a sentencing regime is inconsistent. ... " with Miller's
reasoning). At a young age, Bright was abandoned by his father. Id. at 4. Bright's father "suffered
from substance abuse and physical disabilities". Id. Bright's family lacked financial resources and
at one point, Bright shared a room with his mother at his grandmother's house. Id. The
Commonwealth argued that Bright was not legally entitled to an individualized sentencing
determination. Brief for the Commonwealth at 22, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4,2016) 2015 WL 5223642 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 26,2015).
4 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 2. Bright was a "16-year-old boy when
he got caught up in a feud between adult drug dealers. .. " Id. at 2. See Brief of the Sentencing
Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9-10, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016) (No. 16-579), 2016 WL 6819719 (Nov. 15,
2016) (noting thousands of children are serving mandatory life sentences). In 2016, one hundred
and forty two people were serving life sentences with the possibility of parole as the result of crimes
they committed as children. Id. at 10. Of those serving life sentences for crimes committed as
children, more than ninety percent received mandatory sentences without a judge considering any
individual factors. Id. at 9 n.3 (citing Massachusetts Department of Corrections data obtained by
The Sentencing Project).
41 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 4-5. Bright earned full scholarships to
attend Cambridge Friends School and Buckingham, Browne & Nichols School, two elite private
schools in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Id. at 4. Bright earned his highest grades during the semester
before his arrest. Id.
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potentially mitigating factors because Massachusetts law mandated a life
sentence for second-degree murder.42 Thus, Bright received the same
draconian sentence as more culpable individuals, like repeat offenders
convicted of second- degree murder.43 Miller held that individualized
sentencing is necessary and that judges must have the opportunity to bear in
mind factors such as the child's "age and its hallmark features - among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences"
and "the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of his
participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may
have affected him.""
This court's decision leaves parole as the only mechanism for the
individualized sentencing that Miller requires.4 5 "A parole board's
42 See id. at 36. "The judge said, '[T]his is a sentencing which, on one level, there isn't much
for the Judge to say. By law, the sentence for murder in the second degree is life in prison, with
eligibility for parole after 15 years."' Id. at 7. The court concluded that "it did not have the
authority, whether by statute or under SJC precedent, to deviate from the punishment that the state
legislature had established for second-degree murder convictions." Respondent's Brief in
Opposition at 4, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr.
4, 2016) (No. 16-579), 2017 WL 604578 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb. 20, 2017).
43 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 14. ". . .[A]s a result of judicial
percolation and legislative developments since Miller, every child convicted of certain offenses in
states such as Massachusetts, Texas, and Minnesota must rely on the discretionary whims of the
executive branch for any hope of future release, [citation omitted] while no child convicted of any
crime in states such as Montana, Washington, or Iowa can receive the same sentence absent court's
individualized determination that the sentence is proportionate." Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 5,
Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016) (No. 16579), 2017 WL 782833 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2017).
44 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477 (declaring "a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child
as an adult"); see also Brief of the Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 40, at 11-12 (acknowledging many children serving life sentences were exposed to
violence). "When children are exposed to violence, but do not receive the interventions they need
to deal with these experiences, they are at grave risk of engaging in violent acts themselves." Id. at
12. (citing Cathy Spatz Widom, Child Abuse, Neglect, And Violent Criminal Behavior, 27
Criminology 251-71 (1989)). Many children serving mandatory life sentences "suffered from
difficult family histories", "lacked supportive two-parent households", and "fell in with the wrong
crowd." Id. In fact, many like Bright, "were convicted via felony murder, joint venture, or other
forms of liability that did not require that these children themselves have taken a life." Id. at 13; see
also Sara E. Fiorillo, Note, MitigatingAfter Miller: Legislative Considerationsand Remedies For
the Future of Juvenile Sentencing, 93 B.U.L. REv. 2095, 2127 (2013) (addressing problems with
adopting individualized sentencing approaches). Individualized approaches to sentencing requires
substantial resources. Id. However, it "will address the constitutional problem immediately and
prevent costs from later challenges down the road." Id.
45 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 14-15. The Commonwealth argued that
the parole board is required to consider the Miller factors and the SJC established procedural
protections in the parole process for juvenile homicide offenders "to ensure the opportunity for
release through parole is meaningful." Brief for the Commonwealth at 33, Bright, No. 14-P-546,
2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016). (No. 14-P-546), 2015 WL
5223642 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 26, 2015). "Mr. Bright's petition presents vitally important
questions affecting thousands of individuals sentenced for crimes committed during childhood:
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discretionary and unchallengeable parole decision, through which an
offender has 'no expectation of release,' cannot possibly serve the Eighth
Amendment safeguard function that is necessary to ameliorate the risk of
disproportionate sentencing identified in Miller."' If the court in Brighthad
determined that the availability of discretionary parole was not adequate, it
could have saved years of efforts and resources the Commonwealth will face
revising juvenile sentencing laws in light of the Eighth Amendment. 4 7
whether States can mandate that every child convicted of homicide (even those convicted as joint
venturers) be imprisoned for life with the mere possibility that a future parole board may grant
discretionary early release." Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 2, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4,2016). (No. 16-579), 2017 WL 782833 (U.S. Feb.
28, 2017). "'What in the middle decades of the 20th century was a meaningful process in which
parole boards seriously considered individual claims of rehabilitation has become in most cases a
meaningless ritual in which the form is preserved but parole is rarely granted."' Supra Note 39 at
19-20 (quoting Sharon Dolovich, Creating the Permanent Prisoner, in Life Without Parole:
America's New Death Penalty? 96, 110-11 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds.,
2012)(Dolovich)). Parole boards are "highly susceptible to political pressure" unlike judges who
are "neutral decisionmakers bound to safeguard the constitutional rights of children who come
before them." Id. at 17. See also Sarah French Russell & Tracy L. Denholtz, Symposium Article,
Procedures for Proportionate Sentences: The Next Wave of Eighth Amendment Noncapital
Litigation,48CONN. L. REV. 1121, 1132-33 (2016) (outlining "second look" procedures). "Simply
making a juvenile eligible for parole under an existing state parole system may not comply with
the Eighth Amendment's 'second look' requirement." Id. at 1131. Many States' parole systems do
not ensure meaningful hearings for juvenile offenders by "strictly limiting the involvements of the
prisoner's lawyer, not permitting prisoners to appear before the decision makers, and denying the
prisoner the right to see and rebut significant information relied upon by the parole board." Id. at
1132.
46 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 39, at 24. "Whether the Eighth Amendment
prohibits States from imposing mandatory life sentences of children, with only the hypothetical
opportunity for discretionary parole decades in the future, is a question only this Court, and not
state legislatures, can answer." Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 4-5, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016
Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016). (No. 16-579), 2017 WL 782833
(U.S. Feb. 28, 2017). "Disregarding state-court decisions that expressly interpret this Court's
precedents as having 'no bearing' on whether review is appropriate simply because their holdings
are styled as state-law holdings, shrinks the universe of sources of conflict and needlessly forestalls
this Court's review of vital questions of juvenile justice." Id. See Brief of the Sentencing Project
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 40, at 18-24 (describing how possibility of
parole cannot remedy the unconstitutionality that mandatory life sentences inflict). "Life-sentenced
children, even when eligible for parole, may be denied parole - may spend their entire lives in
prison - for reasons having nothing to do with their own culpability or rehabilitation. That injustice
is possible only because of mandatory sentences authorizing life, like the one [Bright] received."
Id. at 23-24.
47 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supranote 39, at 32. The results of states experimenting
with parole for decades is that "[plarole decisions made by an arm of the very branch of government
responsible for prosecuting juvenile offenders, and release rates that shift with political winds and
do nothing to ensure 'all but the rarest of children' are spared from serving life sentences." Reply
Brief for the Petitioner at 5, Bright, No. 14-P-546, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 379 (Mass.
App. Ct. Apr. 4, 2016) (No. 16-579), 2017 WL 782833 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2017) (quoting Montgomery
v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 726 (2016). See also Sarah French Russell and Tracy L. Denholtz,
Symposium Article, Procedures for Proportionate Sentences: The Next Wave of Eighth
Amendment Noncapital Litigation, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (2016) (discussing how lower
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In Commonwealth v. Bright, the Massachusetts SJC decided the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against sentencing a juvenile to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole does not extend to a life sentence
that does provide eligibility for parole. The court held that juveniles who are
sentenced to life with possibility of parole does not violate the Eighth
Amendment or Article XXVI of the Declaration of Rights of the
Massachusetts Constitution. The court further concluded it was bound by
precedential decisions and stated it was up to those courts to seek expansion.
Dounia Chikhoune

state courts across the United States have reformed procedures to ensure proportionate sentences
for juveniles). "In providing a 'second look' for juveniles, some states are simply using existing
parole systems, whereas other states have reformed their parole practices for juveniles or created
special mechanisms for sentencing review through the courts." Id. "In the past several years, parole
boards in some states have started holding hearings, and many juvenile offenders have been
sentenced or resentenced under Miller." Id.

